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The summer of 2010 will long be remembered in Europe for what has become known as “l’affaire des Roms” in which 
the French government expelled almost 1,000 Romanian and Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin living in France. The 
case has revealed profound institutional tensions at EU level between the French government and the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. The political spectacle that has unfolded has only complicated and added 
confusion to the actual nature and relevance of the affair from an EU perspective. In particular, it has obscured the 
legality of France’s actions in light of that country’s obligations in the context of EU citizenship and free movement 
law, as well as its profound implications for fundamental rights protection. The Roma affair has constituted a severe test 
of the legitimacy of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the overall effectiveness of the EU’s 
legal landscape. The developments in France have demonstrated the limits of current EU enforcement mechanisms in 
providing a swift and depoliticized answer to contested national measures whose compliance with EU law and 
fundamental rights remains questionable.  
With a view to preventing the kind of escalating political conflict that is being witnessed over the Roma affair between 
the EU institutions and a member state, this paper argues that the EU should develop a new ‘freezing enforcement 
procedure’ (complementing existing ones), in cases where there is evidence that certain national measures are in 
violation of EU law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This (ex ante) pre-emptive procedure would have the 
effect of immediately freezing the practical application of the contested national practice until the Commission had 
decided upon the formal launching of the infringement and/or fundamental rights proceedings and had reached a formal 
decision on their lawfulness and compatibility with European law and fundamental rights. 
 
The CEPS ‘Liberty and Security in Europe’ publication series offers the views and critical reflections of 
CEPS researchers and external collaborators with key policy discussions surrounding the construction of 
the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-oriented and 
interdisciplinary academic studies and commentary about the internal and external implications of 
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Introduction 
“France will continue to return European citizens residing irregularly on French soil to their 
country of origin.”
1 This was the official response given by the French Minister of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity And Development – Eric Besson – to the Resolution adopted by 
the European Parliament on 9 September 2010 on “the situation of Roma and on freedom of 
movement in the European Union”. The European Parliament (EP) had expressed “its deep 
concerns at the measures taken by the French authorities targeting Roma and travellers” and 
urged France “to immediately suspend all expulsions of Roma”.
2 The background to this 
‘exchange’ was the announcement by the French government at the end of July of a package of 
measures mainly calling for the removal of Roma and other so-called ‘gens du voyage’ 
(‘travellers’) – mainly European citizens from Bulgaria and Romania. This initiative resulted in 
the swift dismantlement of 128 irregular settlements and the expulsion of around 979 
individuals to their countries of origin by the end of August.  
What has become known as ‘l’affaire des Roms’ in France has revealed a profound institutional 
tension at EU level between the French government and the two main institutional motors of 
European integration (the European Commission and the European Parliament). The high level 
of politicization that has surrounded the affair has only added to the confusion over its nature 
and implications at EU level, especially in light of the content of the EP’s Resolution and the 
Commission’s intention to launch infringement proceedings against France for a discriminatory 
and incorrect application of EU citizenship and free movement law. The political battlefield that 
has emerged out of the developments in France provides important evidence of the need to 
devise new EU policy strategies facilitating a better response to such situations, beyond the 
existing set of enforcement mechanisms to ensure member states’ compliance with EU law and 
fundamental rights.  
                                                      
∗ Sergio Carrera is Head of Section and Research Fellow in the Justice and Home Affairs Section of the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS). He is also Visiting Lecturer at the University of Kent (Brussels School of 
International Studies). Anaïs Faure Atger is a Researcher in the same section. The authors would like to 
express their gratitude to Professors Elspeth Guild and Hildegard Schneider for their comments on a previous 
version of this paper.  
1 Ministère de l’Immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire, Résolution 
du parlement européen relative à l’évacuation des campements illicites: Eric Besson réagit, Communiqué de 
Presse, Paris, le jeudi 9 septembre 2010: «La France entend aussi que les ressortissants européens qui 
séjournent sur son sol sans respecter ces conditions continuent à être reconduits dans leur pays d’origine, de 
manière volontaire ou contrainte, quelle que soit leur origine ethnique ou leur nationalité».  
2 European Parliament, Resolution on the situation of Roma and on freedom of movement in the European 
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European citizenship, freedom of movement and fundamental rights law now stand at the heart 
of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).
3 The progressive Europeanisation of 
citizenship of the Union since 1993, along with the consolidation of the fundamental rights of 
freedom of movement and non-discrimination within the EU Treaties and legal framework, has 
reduced the level of discretion enjoyed by EU member states when carrying out their remits of 
EU law. This includes the rights and procedural safeguards granted to nationals of EU member 
states exercising their freedom to move (entry and residence); their right to be treated in a non-
discriminatory manner, including (yet not only) on the basis of ethnic origin, in contrast with 
nationals of the receiving member state. The legality of EU member states’ actions falling 
within the scope of European law is subject to the scrutiny of the substantive and institutional 
monitoring mechanisms of the EU legal system. The latter are mainly in the hands of the 
Commission which, in conformity with Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), 
has not only been entrusted to pursue “the general interest of the EU” but also to ensure the 
application of the Treaties and legislative measures adopted by the institutions of the Union. 
The Commission therefore acts as ‘the guarantor of Treaties’ by overseeing the application of 
EU law under the judicial control of the Court of Justice of the EU. As l’affaire des Roms has 
demonstrated, however, some EU member states still have major difficulties in realising the 
exact nature and extent of their obligations at Union level and in recognising the supervisory 
powers that have been conferred to the EU institutions for monitoring implementation of EU 
law and their respect of the rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(hereinafter the EU Charter).  
The Roma affair in France has constituted a test to the legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ and the 
overall effectiveness of the EU legal landscape. Independently of the concerns expressed by 
various European actors on the tensions that the nature and effects of the French measures pose 
to European law and the EU Charter, the French government has not only showed resistance 
towards the powers conferred to the EU institutions but it has even ‘caricaturized’ the 
competences held by the Commission in enforcing EU law as well as those of the European 
Parliament in ensuring democratic accountability. The main impact that the reactions by the EU 
institutions have had so far at national level has been a gradual shift in the political language 
used by the French authorities, who have tried hard to defend the legality of the dismantling and 
expulsion measures with EU and international law (as well as its ‘Republican and humanist 
traditions and laws’) and insisted that the measures have not specifically targeted Roma ‘entant 
que tel’ (as such), but rather all nationals of other EU member states not respecting EU free 
movement rules. The rather unexpected publication by the media of a Circulaire of 5 August 
2010, issued by the French Ministry of Interior for implementing the ‘measures’, left their 
remarks open to question the instructions clearly focused on Roma as the main target group of 
the repressive actions.  
Since then the political spectacle that has emerged has attracted intense media attention, which 
has not served the interests of either of the parties involved nor their reputation in European 
public opinion or with the international community at large. The succession of unfortunate 
remarks and the exchange of accusations has perhaps more worryingly nuanced the actual issue 
of discussion (i.e. compliance by France with EU citizenship and fundamental rights law) and 
                                                      
3 Article 3.2 of the revised version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states: “The Union shall offer 
its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” On the ways in which these fields have become 
central components of European integration over the last years, see E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. Eggenschwiler 
(eds), The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ten years on: Successes and Future Challenges under the 
Stockholm Programme, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2010.  L’AFFAIRE DES ROMS: A CHALLENGE TO THE EU’S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 3 
 
the fact that France has reasserted its intentions to continue with the dismantlement of irregular 
settlements and the expulsion of EU citizens of Roma origin. The question that is now left is 
what should the EU do?  
There are at present two main mechanisms at the disposal of the European institutions for 
ensuring compliance by member states with European law and fundamental rights. First there 
are the infringement proceedings envisaged by Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), which confers the discretion on the Commission to launch action 
against any EU member state for non-compliance with European law. These proceedings may 
end up before the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, which will in the final instance determine the 
extent to which the state is in breach of EU law and, if so, will require the latter to take the 
necessary measures for ensuring compliance, and potentially even impose financial penalties in 
those cases where the state is still in violation of European legal commitments. There is also the 
fundamental rights mechanism stipulated in Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union, 
which foresees the possibility to apply sanctions against any EU member state (suspension of 
the voting rights of the member state in the Council) when “the existence of a serious and 
persistent breach” to the Union’s basic principles, including fundamental rights protection, is 
determined. Until now, however, this last procedure has never been used. Both procedures are 
to a great extent too politicized and generally ex post in nature (they come into play after the 
‘violation’ has been effectively proved and determined), which prevents them from facilitating a 
preventative and immediate response to those cases where grave violations of basic EU law 
(and fundamental freedoms and rights principles) are thought to have taken place.  
This paper argues that the Roma affair in France demonstrates the limitations of these 
enforcement mechanisms in providing a swift and depoliticized response to national measures 
whose compliance with EU law and fundamental rights remains questionable. The EU should 
therefore develop a new tool in its enforcement procedures that would be primarily designed to 
prevent the cascade of political conflict and contentious discourse which we have recently 
witnessed between the core Union institutions and one single EU member state. This pre-
emptive procedure would consist of the immediate freezing of the practical application of 
contested national practices (such as the dismantling of settlements and expulsion of European 
citizens of Roma origin) before the Commission has decided on the formal launching of the 
infringement and/or fundamental rights proceedings and has reached a formal decision on their 
lawfulness and compatibility with European law and fundamental rights. This new ‘freezing 
enforcement procedure’ would supplement the current enforcement instruments in the EU legal 
system with an additional procedure ensuring a prompt response to affairs where the 
foundations and basic principles of the EU are in serious jeopardy. 
Before developing further the main components delineating our proposal, the paper starts by 
outlining the facts substantiating the Roma affair in France. After contextualising the case, we 
then move into a legal assessment of the French policy measures against relevant EU law 
standards/obligations, including citizenship and freedom of movement rights as well as the EU 
Charter. The nature and appropriateness of the various reactions by Commission and the EP, as 
well as by other relevant international and regional actors, are then reviewed in section 3. 
Section 4 complements our analysis by providing a picture of the political spectacle that has 
emerged around this affair both at national and EU levels. Section 5 outlines the current 
supervisory and monitoring mechanisms that exist at Union level for ensuring the correct 
application of EU law by the member states and highlights their limitations to provide a timely 
response to events such as those still occurring in France. We then conclude with a set of policy 
recommendations focusing on concrete strategies to overcome the deficits that affect the 
European legal system on fundamental rights and European law monitoring and argue for the 
development of a new ‘freezing enforcement procedure’ at EU level. 4 | SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER 
 
1.  Background to the affair 
Our story starts with the delivery by French President Sarkozy of the Declaration sur la 
sécurité
4 on 21 July 2010, in response to a long series of unfortunate events that had diminished 
his popularity (and that of his government) and included unrest and violence in the suburbs, 
clashes between police and ‘travelling people’ (les gens du voyage), increasing attacks against 
law enforcement authorities and a rather unpopular pensions reform.
5 In his speech at Grenoble 
on 30 July 2010, Sarkozy did not hesitate to make sweeping announcements on the need for 
future legislative reforms (of a rather restrictive nature) on internal security, migration and 
citizenship rules, and underlined as a political priority the fight against criminality and his 
intention to launch an “authentic war on traffickers and delinquents”. He then moved on to 
declaring that the behaviour of certain travellers and Roma was a particular source of problems 
in this context and proposed the adoption of a set of measures to dismantle irregular Roma 
settlements and expel their inhabitants from France. As a follow-up to these presidential 
declarations, a ministerial meeting “on the situation of travellers and Roma in France” 
confirmed the enactment of the following initiatives:
6 
First, the systematic dismantling of ‘irregular settlements’. While this was justified by the 
unacceptable living conditions therein, the political discourses that backed up these measures 
referred to them as “zones de non-droit” and sources of “illicit trafficking, child exploitation for 
the purpose of begging, prostitution as well as crime”. Furthermore, should the illegality of the 
settlement not be proven, the launch of a fiscal check was recommended to ensure that all the 
relevant laws were duly respected. Future proposals included a new law to facilitate the 
eradication of settlements in France.  
Second, the return of irregularly staying EU citizens accused of “abusing” EU citizenship and 
free movement law. It was declared that this should in future be facilitated by an amendment to 
the current national legislation in order to widen the possibilities for invoking expulsion on the 
grounds of threats to public order and public security.
7 
Third, increased cooperation with Romanian authorities to facilitate the return of their 
nationals as well as the socio-economic inclusion of Romanian Roma. With the exception of the 
ratification of a Convention on the return of unaccompanied minors, the only additional 
concrete initiative consisted in the reciprocal posting of French policemen in Romania.
8 
Following these announcements, several administrative guidelines (Circulaires) were issued to 
give instructions on ways in which these ministerial guidelines needed be interpreted and 
applied. Primarily aimed at translating into practice the instructions given at governmental level, 
they remained confidential until their disclosure by the media in the beginning of September 
2010.
9 In fact, until their publication, their existence had been openly denied by the 
                                                      
4 Déclaration de M. le Président de la République sur la sécurité, Conseil des ministres, Palais de l'Elysée, 
21.07.2010. 
5 Refer for instance to “Une gendarmerie attaquée à la hache dans le Loir-et-Cher”, Le Monde, 16.7.2010; or 
“La nuit a été plus calme à Grenoble, quadrillée par les forces de l’ordre”, 17.7.2010. 
6 Communiqué de presse, Communiqué faisant suite à la réunion ministérielle de ce jour sur la situation des 
gens du voyage et des Roms, available at www.elysee.fr  
7 Projet de loi relatif a l’immigration, l’integration et la nationalite, (n° 2814) Amendement présenté par les 
membres du groupe SRC. See Statewatch (2010), Immigration law amendment to turn expulsion of EU 
nationals into routine, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/sep/02france-expulsion-routine.htm  
8 Déclaration Conjointe des Ministres Roumains et Français, Communique de Presse, Paris, le jeudi 9 
septembre 2010.  
9 Refer to http://www.lecanardsocial.com/Article.aspx?i=193  L’AFFAIRE DES ROMS: A CHALLENGE TO THE EU’S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 5 
 
representatives of the French government. While it transpires from their reading that the order to 
evacuate illicit settlements was already given in June 2010, the circulaire of 5 August 2010 was 
the one plainly instructing the authorities to target Roma when implementing the dismantling 
and expulsion measures. In addition to the setting of target numbers of settlements to be 
dismantled (at least 100 a month so as to reach 300 within three months), explicit command was 
stressed to give priority to those settlements occupied by the Roma.
10 The circulaire even 
regretted that the implementation of previous governmental instructions had so far resulted in 
“too few” expulsions of Roma. The operational instructions of August 5
th thus provided for the 
evacuation of irregular settlements and for the immediate return of those Roma irregularly 
staying on French territory. Shortly after, and as we will see below, mainly as a consequence of 
the concerns expressed at EU level by the Commission and the EP, a new circulaire was 
adopted by the Ministry of Interior on 13 September 2010 reasserting the overall objective of 
the original instructions but this time ‘carefully’ omitting any express and direct reference to 
Roma.
11 
According to a speech delivered by the French Minister of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity and Development – Eric Besson – in a press conference organised on 30 August 2010 
on the “evacuation of illicit settlements”, between 28 July and 27 August 2010, a total number 
of 979 nationals of Romania and Bulgaria in an irregular situation had been returned to their 
countries of origin, of which 828 were said to be ‘voluntary’ in nature and 151 forced returns.
12 
It is important to stress that this was not the first time that this country has engaged in the 
expulsion of Roma holding the nationality of another EU member state. Since 2007 France has 
devised a complex procedure of ‘humanitarian’ returns that involves the granting of a financial 
retribution – “financial aid” – of €300 (€100 to minors) and the future inclusion of biometric 
data of the returnees into a database named OSCAR (which is expected to be operational as 
from October of this year) so as to prevent multiple applications and ‘abuse’ of the financial 
assistance.
13 This ‘humanitarian return’ of individuals on the basis of their inability to sustain 
themselves has mainly targeted nationals of Romania and Bulgaria of Roma origin. The fact 
that the Roma who are being expelled are citizens of the Union has constituted the linking factor 
for the case to gain relevance and implications at EU level. Since 2007, both countries have 
joined the EU and as EU citizens, their nationals (independently of their ethnic origin) benefit 
from the set of well-delineated European rights of entry, stay and protection against expulsions 
as enshrined in European citizenship and free movement law as well as the EU Charter of 




                                                      
10 Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Circulaire IOC/K/1017881/J du 5 
août 2010, Paris, Objet  : Evacuation des campements illicits. It stated: «Il revient donc, dans chaque 
département, aux préfets d’engager, sur la base de l’état de situaion des 21 et 23 juillet, une démarche 
systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, en priorité ceux du Rom.». 
11 Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Circulaire Objet: Evacuation des 
campements illicites, le 13 septembre 2010.  
12 Discours d’Eric Besson, Ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du 
développement solidaire, Conférence de presse du lundi 30 août 2010 A propos de l’évacuation des 
campements illicites, Paris, le 30 août 2010, retrievable from www.immigration.gouv.fr  
13 Refer to C. Cahn and E. Guild (2008), Recent Migration of Roma in Europe, Study commissioned by the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 10 December 2008, available at www.coe.int  6 | SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER 
 
2.  Testing the case against EU citizenship and free movement law 
One of the central questions surrounding the political debates during the past weeks has been 
the extent to which the French measures were ‘legal’ and in conformity with EU law and the EU 
Charter. The protection of nationals of other EU member states against expulsion (freedom of 
movement and security of residence) lies at the heart of the institution of Union citizenship and 
of Europe’s foundations on the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. The lawfulness of 
the expulsions of European citizens needs to be evaluated more precisely against the principles 
of freedom of movement and non-discrimination as envisaged by the Treaties and the EU 
Charter, and as developed by the Citizens Directive 2004/38.  
The establishment of the citizenship of the Union with the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993 has meant that EU nationals now benefit from a supranational regime of 
protection consisting of a shared framework of rights which include the freedom of movement 
within the territory of other member states, and to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner 
(equal treatment) in comparison with the nationals of the receiving state (Article 21 TFEU).
14 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the new EU Treaties’ 
landscape needs to be understood in conjunction with the EU Charter, which has acquired the 
same legally binding nature as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU). The EU Charter applies to both EU 
institutions as well as member states’ actions falling within the scope of EU law.
15 The EU 
Charter has transformed the general principles of ‘freedom of movement’ and ‘non-
discrimination’ into key normative components of the package of core ‘fundamental rights’ of 
the Union’s legal system and the very status of European citizenship.  
The citizenship-related freedoms envisaged by the Treaties have been given material effect 
through the adoption of Directive 2004/38 on the right of the citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states (hereinafter 
the Citizens Directive).
16 The general rule purported by this Directive is that any national of an 
EU member state has the right to exit and enter into the territory of another member state with 
mere evidence of a valid passport and/or ID card.
17 It provides for a harmonized set of rules on 
the right of residence in a second EU member state as well as procedural guarantees to be 
complied with by national authorities when considering expulsion of an EU citizen. For periods 
of more than three months, a right of residence exists if the Union citizens are workers or self-
employed persons, students or following vocational training, have sufficient resources for them 
and their family members not to become a burden to the social assistance system and have 
                                                      
14 F.G. Jacobs (2007), “Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis”, European Law Journal, 
Special Issue on EU Citizenship, Vol. 13, Issue 5, pp. 591-622. T. Kostakopoulou (2007), “European 
Citizenship: Writing the Future”, European Law Journal, Special Issue on EU Citizenship, Vol. 13, Issue 5, pp. 
623-646. 
15 E. Guild (2010), Fundamental Rights and EU Citizenship after the Treaty of Lisbon, CEPS Liberty and 
Security in Europe Series, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, July; S. Peers and A. Ward 
(eds), The EU Charter of Rights: Politics, Law and Policy, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
16 Council Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the member states, 29 April 2004. For an analysis of the Directive refer to S. 
Carrera (2005), “What does Free Movement mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?”, European Law 
Journal, Vol. 11, No. 6, November, pp. 699-721. I. Alexovicová (2005), “The Right of Citizens of the Union 
and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States”, in H. 
Schneider (ed.), Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Vol. 1, Maastricht: 
Forum Maastricht, pp. 73-106. 
17 On how this extends beyond EU nationals, see S. Carrera and A. Wiesbrock (2010), “Whose European 
Citizenship in the Stockholm Programme? The Enactment of Citizenship by Third Country Nationals in the 
EU”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 12, pp. 337-359. L’AFFAIRE DES ROMS: A CHALLENGE TO THE EU’S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 7 
 
comprehensive sickness insurance. This also applies to family members of the individuals 
falling in any of those categories. After five years of continuous residence the citizens of the 
Union shall be granted a right of permanent residence.
18 As regards procedural guarantees, an 
EU national exercising his/her freedom of movement (as well as their family members) benefits 
from security of residence, which implies protection against expulsion from the receiving state. 
EU member states can only apply restrictions on the right of entry and residence on well-
determined grounds of public policy, public security and/or public health. As has been declared 
by the Court of Justice, and confirmed by the Commission, the principle of the free movement 
of persons is one of the foundations of the EU and any provisions granting that ‘European 
freedom’ must be interpreted broadly and any derogation and expectation to it must be given a 
strict interpretation.
19 EU member states must therefore comply with the prioritisation conferred 
to “the right of free movement” over the exceptional application of any derogation to the latter 
(in order to secure public policy, security and health). Any such restrictions should also in any 
case comply with the following procedural safeguards:
20 
First, the grounds for expulsion cannot be invoked to serve ‘economic ends’. 
Second, they need to comply with the general principle of EU law of proportionality and be 
based on the exclusive conduct of the person involved. Previous criminal convictions can be 
taken as the grounds for expulsion. 
Third, the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.  
Fourth, the expiry of an identity card or passport cannot constitute grounds for expulsion. 
Fifth, before conducting the expulsion of a person on the basis of public policy, public security 
or public health, the national authorities will need to carry out a case-by-case assessment taking 
into account the following considerations: the length of residence on its territory, age, family 
and economic situation, state of health, social and cultural integration into the host member state 
and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin. 
Sixth, if the person has resided in that EU member state for the previous ten years or is a minor 
an expulsion decision will be exclusively acceptable if based on “imperative grounds of public 
security”. 
                                                      
18 On the issue of access to social benefits in the scope of the Directive, see P. Minderhoud (2009), “Free 
Movement, Directive 2004/38 and Access to Social Benefits”, in P. Minderhoud and N. Trimikliniotis (eds), 
Rethinking the free movement of workers: The European challenges ahead, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
pp. 69-85. 
19 See the Court of Justice Cases 139/85 Kempf and C-33/07 Jipa. See also the Commission Communication on 
guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2009) 313 
final, Brussels, 2.7.2009. See, in particular Section 3 of the Communication. See also E. Guild (2007), 
“Citizens without a Constitution, Borders Without a State: EU Free Movement of Persons”, in A. Baldaccini, 
E. Guild and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and 
Policy, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 25-56. 
20 For an overview of the case law of the Court of Justice on “public policy and public security” exceptions and 
other ‘soft borders’ refer to N. Trimikliniotis (2009), “Exceptions, Soft Borders and Free Movement for 
Workers”, in P. Minderhoud and N. Trimikliniotis (eds), Rethinking the free movement of workers: The 
European challenges ahead, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 135-154. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the special measures concerning the movement 
and residence of citizens of the Union which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health, COM/99/0372 final, 19.7.1999. 8 | SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER 
 
Seventh, the individuals’ concerned need to be granted access to judicial and administrative 
redress procedures in the member state to appeal or seek review of the decision taken against 
them. 
Finally, member states cannot impose a re-entry ban together with an expulsion decision.  
In so far as the French measures fall within the champ d‘application of EU citizenship and free 
movement law,
21 their national transposition and practical implementation must comply with 
the following fundamental rights envisaged by the EU Charter: first, the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic or social origin or membership to a national minority 
(Article 21 of the EU Charter), which needs to be read in conjunction with the Council Directive 
on the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin
22 and 
second, the prohibition of ‘collective expulsions’ as stipulated in Article 19 of the Charter.
23 
As exemplified by the above-mentioned Circulaire of 5
th August 2010, the dismantling of 
irregular settlements and the collective expulsions conducted by the French authorities have 
targeted the Roma. One can only imagine the ways in which the instructions given in the scope 
of the circularies have been implemented by the relevant local law-enforcement authorities, 
who were told that they were actually eradicating “the sources of criminality and trafficking”. 
The quasi-systematic targeting of the Roma in the dismantlement of irregular settlements during 
the operations carried out in the month of August has now been confirmed by the main French 
travellers’ associations, l’Union française des associations tsiganes.
24 Several deportations 
orders against Roma had been actually annulled on the 27
th August by a French administrative 
tribunal in Lille. It based its decision on the fact that the illegal occupation of a public space did 
not amount to a ‘threat of public order’ and therefore did not thus justify a return order for these 
people.
25 The change in official discourse by the French authorities since the end of August and 
the consequent amendment of the Circulaire 5
th August by another one adopted on the 13
th 
September 2010 omitting any express reference to ‘Roma’ in the scope of evacuation and return 
measures do not negate the fact that the expulsions that have been already carried out 
individually target this ethnic group, as well as the announced continuation of dismantling of 
settlements and expulsions to Romania and Bulgaria, which will in any case ‘indirectly’ affect 
Roma and other vulnerable groups falling under the general label of ‘travellers’.  
From an EU law perspective the order to ‘immediately’ enforce the collective expulsions of 
non-nationals from the territory is not conducive to an individual assessment of the personal 
situation of the returnees or the respect of the procedural guarantees of the Citizens Directive. 
Moreover, it is far from clear the extent to which the people who have been deported had been 
residing in French soil for longer than three months. The fact that France has not properly 
transposed into its national law the procedural guarantees envisaged by this Directive brings 
                                                      
21 Also relevant at times of evaluating the lawfulness of the French affair is the Recital 31 of the Citizens 
Directive’s Preamble which emphasizes that “In accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in 
the Charter, Member States should implement this Directive without discrimination between the beneficiaries 
of this Directive on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, 
religion or beliefs, political or other opinion, membership of an ethnic minority, property, birth, disability, age 
or sexual orientation, (Emphasis added).” 
22 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000. 
23 Moreover, the implications of the expulsion of minors with Article 24 of the Charter remains equally an issue 
of concern, as it is also the compatibility of the ‘OSCAR’ database with Article 8 of the Charter. 
24 Le Monde, « Les gens du voyage assurent que le démantèlement des camps visait les Roms », 23.09.2010 
25 «  Roms : un tribunal annule quatre arrêtés de reconduite à la frontière  », Le Monde, 27.8.2010, 
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further uncertainties about the entire lawfulness of the expulsions. In its 2008 Report on the 
evaluation of EU member states’ transposition of this Directive, the Commission had already 
found France to be in violation of EU law over the procedural safeguards of the Directive.
26 The 
Commission stated there that “in cases of absolute urgency, no procedural safeguards apply in 
France. The EU citizen receives no written notification of the expulsion decision, is not 
informed of the grounds on which the decision was taken and has no right of appeal before the 
decision is enforced.” The disproportionate application of expulsion measures in France against 
nationals from Romania was also an issue of concern for the European Parliament and external 
independent studies.
27 In fact, the transposition and practical implementation of the Citizens 
Directive was subject to a legal complaint introduced by eight French NGOs, which has so far 
not triggered any reaction or acknowledgement by the Commission.
28 These front-line civil 
society organisations had claimed that France’s observance of the obligation to individually 
assess the personal situation of persons to be expelled, its interpretation of threats to public 
order as well as the granting of procedural rights do not comply with the parameters outlined in 
the Directive.  
The vulnerability of EU citizens of Roma origin at times of exercising their freedom of 
movement rights across the Union was additionally highlighted by a report of the EU Agency 
for the Protection of Fundamental Rights (FRA) in Vienna, which observed 
a disturbingly negative Roma-specific dynamic stemming from: First, the arrival of 
Roma EU citizens is often seen negatively and little effort is made to support their 
integration into the local labour market; Second, the existence of anti-Roma policies in 
some EU member states; and third, the practice of certain policies which affect Roma 
EU citizens’ access to social benefits.
29 
This structural discrimination of the Roma community challenges certain governmental 
discourses; by referring to them as an “unreasonable burden to the social assistance system” of 
the receiving member states. Indeed, they are systematically excluded from the social welfare 
system and the ‘public policy and public security’ exceptions to the exercise of the freedom of 
movement cannot be said to apply.
30 There was therefore already plenty of independent and 
sound evidence in the hands of the EU institutions (and particularly the Commission) 
illustrating the incorrect implementation by France of EU citizenship and free movement law, 
and the difficult relation between the French coercive measures and fundamental rights, much 
                                                      
26 Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States COM(2008)840, 
10.12.2008, Brussels.  
27 See also the European Parliament Resolution on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of EU 
citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 15 
November 2007. Refer also to S. Carrera and A. Faure-Atger (2009), Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in 
the context of Enlargement: A Proliferation of Different Forms of Citizenship?, CEPS Liberty and Security 
Series, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, April. 
28 CCFD, Cimade, FASTI, GISTI, Hors la Rue, LDH, MRAP, Collectif Romeurope, Plainte contre la France 
pour violations du droit communautaire en matière de libre circulation des personnes, 30.07.2010 
29 Fundamental Rights Agency, The situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in other EU Member 
States, November 2009. 
30 See Article 7.1 of the Citizens Directive 2004/38, which states in relation to the right of residence for more 
than three months that “All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member 
State for a period of longer than three months if they: b. have sufficient resources for themselves and their 
family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their 
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before the measures were enforced during the summer 2010. Yet, what have been the main 
European responses after the latest developments?  
3.  Testing the EU responses 
The implementation of the dismantling and expulsion measures since the beginning of August 
2010 has attracted wide attention in the media inside and outside the EU, with journalists 
turning towards Brussels for ‘a comment’ or some sort of condemnation. The much-praised 
renewed European institutional setting resulting from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the legally binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights were somehow 
expected to enable a strong European stance when faced with potential fundamental rights 
violations such as those supposedly at stake in France. The new Commission and in particular 
its new Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental rights and citizenship – Viviane Reding – were 
perceived to be well-placed to play such a role. The Catholic Church immediately condemned 
the French measures as did the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racism and 
Discrimination, the Council of Europe as well as an impressively large number of national and 
international NGOs and civil society organisations.
31 Brussels remained silent however.  
The first EU response only arrived on 25 August 2010, through a written statement by Reding 
“on the Roma situation in Europe”.
32 The Commissioner announced that the French government 
had given the Commission “political assurances” as to the conformity of their practices with EU 
law, but it also specified that further precisions on the situation were however needed. In the 
meantime three Commissioners had instructed their respective services (Directorate General 
(DG) for Justice, DG for Employment, social affairs and equal opportunities and DG Home 
Affairs) to draft a common Information Note so as to clarify ‘the state of the situation’ in 
France. Along with an outline of the development of the French affair since July 2010, the Joint 
Information Note contained a preliminary legal analysis and proposed steps for future action on 
Roma in Europe.
33 The note was dated September 1
st which coincided with the day following a 
visit to Brussels by Ministers Besson and Lellouche to discuss “the French measures” along 
with the Commission.
34 They had attended the Commission’s Working Meeting convened for 
the purpose of encouraging French and Romanian authorities to discuss and present their 
respective stances on the events. It is striking that the note did not include any reference either 
to the famous circulaire of August 5
th or to the above-mentioned complaint filed by French 
NGOs to the Commission. This is surprising as the detailed evidence that the compliant could 
                                                      
31 As a way of illustration we can refer to the comments by the Council of Europe Human Rights 
Commissioner available at http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=77 See also 
“Rights of migrants in France: Commissioner Hammarberg calls on the authorities to comply fully with 
European standards”, available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/News/2010/100921LetterFrance_en.asp 
Refer also the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination 
http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/680AEEF478947431C125777D004
7B764?OpenDocument See ENAR organizes EU-wide protest against France xenophobic policies, Press 
Release, 1 September 2010, Brussels, www.enar-eu.org or EU Roma Policy Coalition, European Union should 
do more to uphold Roma Rights, Press Release, 8 September 201, Brussels. Amnesty International, France 
must end stigmatization of Roma and travelers, Press Release, 27 August 2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/france-must-end-stigmatization-roma-and-travellers-2010-08-27  
32 Statement by Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission and EU Commissioner for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, on the Rome situation in Europe, MEMO/10/384, Brussels, 25 
August 2010. 
33 European Commission, The Situation of Roma in France and in Europe, Joint Information Note by Vice-
President Viviane Reding, Commissioner László Andor and Commissioner Cecilia Malsmtröm, 1 September 
2010. 
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have brought further insight into the dilemmas of the situation on the ground. The analysis on 
the compliance of the French measures with the legal framework carried out by the Commission 
ended in a conditional way by specifying that further information was still required to reach a 
conclusion on the affair. After a month, the Commission thus concluded that investigations 
should be pursued and no concrete measure was adopted. Contrary to what the French 
government had claimed during the summer, the legality of the French practices still remained 
far from evident. 
The EP’s condemnation on 9 September 2010 was on the other hand resolute.
35 In a Resolution 
adopted only a few days after having come back into office, 337 MEPs against 245 called for 
the immediate suspension of the removals in France.
36 The debates which took place inside the 
EP were heated but a largely shared position was the condemnation of the Commission’s timid 
attitude (with Barroso’s Commission accused of not having condemned the French 
government’s actions vigorously enough), and the call for a swift investigation into the legality 
of the affair. The EP urged the Commission, the Council and the member states to intervene in 
their request to the French authorities to “immediately suspend” all expulsions of Roma and 
expressed concerns on “the late and limited response by the Commission, as guardian of the 
Treaties, to the need to verify the consistency of member states’ actions with EU primary law 
and EU legislation”. The EP’s response was therefore fast, efficient and of an EU-wide reach. 
In contrast, the position of the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
was indeed rather ambivalent until mid-September 2010. A few days after the EP Resolution, 
however, the Commission made a ‘blistering’ declaration on that date which constituted a 
substantial move from its former position towards the French government’s measures against 
Roma and which was seen by certain media as an action “dividing the EU”.
37 It was only on her 
speech of September 14
th on “the latest developments on the Roma situation”
38 when for the 
first time Reding explicitly referred to the Commission’s intention to initiative infringement 
procedures against France. She started by expressing her ‘deepest concerns’ on the 
developments in France regarding Roma and said that 
I personally have been appalled by a situation which gave the impression that people 
are being removed from a member state of the European Union just because they 
belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is a situation I had thought Europe would not 
have to witness again after the Second World War. 
Reacting to the now evidently false political assurances which had been given by Members of 
the French government to the Commission on their non-discriminatory nature, Reding deplored 
the fact that the Commission could not rely on national officials’ answers when asked about 
their practices when implementing EU law and qualified the situation as a “disgrace”.
39 Reding 
stated that “enough is enough” and that “no member state can expect special treatment, 
especially not when fundamental values and European laws are at stake. This applies today to 
France”. She thus indicated her ‘intention’ to initiative infringement proceedings against France 
                                                      
35 “Outraged MEPs attack France over Roma Policy”: Political groups in the Parliament ready to recommend a 
formal condemnation of Nicolas Sarkozy, European Voice, 2.9.2010. 
36 European Parliament Resolution of 9 September 2010 on the situation of Roma and on freedom of movement 
in the European Union, 9 September 2010.  
37 “Reding divides the EU with an attack on France”, European Voice, 16.9.2010. 
38 V. Reding, Statement on the Latest Developments on the Roma Situation, Speech/10/428, Brussels, 14 
September 2010, Midday briefing in Press Room.  
39 The Commissioner mentioned that “I can only express my deepest regrets that the political assurances given 
by two French ministers officially mandated to discuss this matter with the European Commission are now 
openly contradicted by an administrative circular (of 5
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for a discriminatory application of the Citizens Directive 2004/38, as well as for the lack of 
transposition of its procedural and substantive guarantees. This intention has so far not yet 
materialised in a formal opening of enforcement actions (infringement proceedings) against 
France. While the Commission continues to study the affair from a legal point of view, it 
appears that infringement proceedings will be formally launched sooner rather than later.  
The Extraordinary (Foreign Affairs) Council meeting of the 16
th September 2010, which was 
originally intended to deal exclusively with the EU’s external relations policy, become de facto 
‘the situation of Roma in Europe’ meeting and allowed member states’ governments to meet 
and discuss the affair, while not reaching a common position on the issue.
40 The event provided 
a glimpse into games and power struggles at European level among European and national 
interests on the case. It also publicly displayed a confrontation between the French government 
(and its supporters) with the European Commission, and most interestingly experienced one of 
the first ‘violent clashes’ between Sarkozy and Barroso inside the Council rooms.
41 The 
discussions were overshadowed by the unfortunate choice of words used by Commissioner 
Reding on the previously mentioned September 14
th speech concerning the parallel with the 
(Nazi) situation of the Second World War, which was to a great extent used by the French 
government to avoid addressing the actual facts and dilemmas of the case from an EU law 
viewpoint.  
On this occasion, bilateral alliances (already apparent in the past) were reasserted and overall 
EU solidarity on the matter appeared to be fading. Evidence of such intergovernmental practice 
had already occurred when on 6
th September 2010 France sought to bypass the European arena 
by inviting ‘a selection’ of member states to an intergovernmental meeting in Paris. Arguably, 
the list of invitees was drafted on the basis of the overall share of immigrants entering their 
territories in annual basis. The Ministries of Interior from Germany, Greece, Italy, the UK, 
Spain and Belgium, as well as the Canadian immigration minister, were thus convened to 
Paris.
42 Labelled as ‘the anti-Roma summit’, the focus of the meeting was promptly shifted to a 
“Working Seminar on asylum and irregular immigration” and Commissioner Malström (DG 
Home Affairs) finally represented the Commission at the event.
43 It was later on publicly 
affirmed that the situation of Roma had not actually been discussed on that day. This illustrates 
how ‘the silence’ of the EU institutions encouraged the French government to seek a resolution 
outside of the EU framework, but without much success. 
So have the EU institutions reacted ‘as they should’ when confronted with allegations of 
fundamental rights and EU law violations in France? The answer is far from straightforward. 
After a seemingly (too) ‘cautious’ and watchful attitude, the Commission’s declarations 
triggered an amendment of the contested legislation with the publication of a new circulaire on 
September 13
th as mentioned above. In these revised instructions French Interior Minister 
Hortefeux removed the explicit targeting of Roma in the dismantling of camps and immediate 
expulsions of their occupants. And if the EP did not manage to halt the deportations, the 
Commission at least forced the French government to rectify the administrative guidelines that 
                                                      
40 Council of the EU, Foreign Affairs, Press Release, 13705/10, Brussels, 16 September 2010. 
41 “Sarkozy unleashes ‘violent’ tirade against Barroso at Summit”, EUobserver, 16.9.2010, 
http://euobserver.com/843/30826  
42 The presence of Canada at this meeting is less surprising when considering that earlier in the year a political 
row was triggered when Canada reinstated visa requirements for Czech nationals after having recognized the 
persecutions suffered by several Czech Roma through their recognition as refugees. 
43 “In Paris, Melchior Wathelet makes a plea for an asylum policy based on responsibility and solidarity”, 
6.9.2010,  http://www.eutrio.be/pressrelease/paris-melchior-wathelet-makes-plea-asylum-policy-based-
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had been previously given and implemented on the ground.
44 Nonetheless, the absence of a 
quick and firm condemnation (and enforcement procedure) against the French measures by the 
Commission played a crucial role in the escalation of heated political discourse, where the 
classical working arrangements between member states’ sovereignty and the European legal 
order was put into question and, perhaps more astonishingly, has not as yet prevented the 
French government from continuing to apply the expulsion measures. The Roma affair in 
France has unleashed a series of strong statements by different actors and a rather unfortunate 
cascade of accusatory discourses between the French government and the European institutions, 
which we shall now attempt to synthesise. 
4.  A political spectacle on the Roma affair: Turf wars and discourses 
It was evident from the outset that public discourses were going to play a central role in the 
developments of the case and their effects both at national and EU levels. As described in 
Section 2 above, the tone was set early on with Sarkozy’s public declarations linking the Roma 
community with insecurity and criminality. Throughout the affair, we have witnessed a constant 
ping-pong of public statements and critiques by national and European officials, often taking 
rather sensationalist stances. In France, the months of August and September have seen an 
impressive number of declarations, press releases and formal and informal interventions from 
various government representatives (and the relevant ministries) to justify, object to and 
condemn the declarations and concerns coming from Brussels, both from the European 
Parliament and the Commission.
45 
Since the start of the affair the French government has artificially linked nomads and the Roma 
community to ‘illegal settlements’, ‘illicit trafficking’ and ‘exploitation of children’ as a means 
to justify the coercive measures used to dismantle settlements and carry out collective (forced 
and ‘voluntary’) expulsions from the country. The general official line of discourse advocated 
by Sarkozy often associated the Roma population with criminality and freedom of movement 
with human trafficking. By doing so the stigmatisation and negative stereotyping of the Roma 
community have only increased. The setting of targets for expulsion further supported a 
discourse in which collective expulsions, in violation of its international human rights 
obligations, appeared to be encouraged. In the past, it is precisely on the basis of such 
discourses that external observers and human rights defenders have criticised some of the 
political discourses taking place in France. 
For instance, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of 
Europe had already recommended in April 2010 that the French authorities should take steps to 
curb the exploitation of racism in political discourse as they  
underlined that a number of remarks by politicians, including by elected persons and 
members of the government, in particular on questions of immigration and integration, 
have been perceived as encouragements to expressions of racism, and, particularly, 
xenophobia.
46 
A similar position was taken by the Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 
a Position Paper titled “Positions on the Human Rights of Roma” where it was emphasised that  
                                                      
44 « Roms: volte-face gouvernementale sur une circulaire », Le Monde, 7 septembre 2010, p. 7. 
45 For an overview of the press releases refer to http://www.immigration.gouv.fr  
46 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe, Report on France, adopted 
on 29 April 2010 and published on 15 June 2010. 14 | SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER 
 
Today’s rhetoric against the Roma is very similar to that used by Nazis and fascists 
before the mass killings started in the thirties and forties. Once more, it is argued that 
the Roma are a threat to safety and public health. No distinction is made between a few 
criminals and the overwhelming majority of the Roma population. This is shameful 
and dangerous.
47 
The Commissioner for Human Rights therefore recommended that “it is crucial that leading 
politicians and other opinion-makers avoid anti-Roma rhetoric and, instead, stand up for the 
principles of non-discrimination, tolerance and respect for people from another background”.
48 
Public figures carefully choose their use of words to project perceptions, opinions and images to 
those who listen in the public at large. The use of such discourse taints a particular group with 
suspicion in the eyes of the population and public officials, and this is precisely what the Roma 
community suffers from.
49 
In her first public intervention on the case delivered on 25
th of August 2010, Commissioner 
Reding echoed the critiques of other international actors and responded that “the rhetoric that 
has been used in some member states in the past weeks has been openly discriminatory and 
openly inflammatory”. In its 9 September Resolution the EP also underlined “the inflammatory 
and openly discriminatory rhetoric that has characterized political discourse during the 
repatriations of Roma, lending credibility to racist statements and the actions of extreme right-
wing groups.” By doing so both institutions emphasized the urgent need to stop stigmatization 
and instead promote ‘Roma inclusion’. The EU’s engagements towards Roma were reasserted 
by bringing to the attention of member states the EU tools at hand for ensuring their inclusion 
and, more importantly still, on the urgency of political commitments.
50 Nonetheless, this 
engagement appears to be lacking among the majority of the EU governments today. Among its 
peers, the French government did not encounter strong disapproval. From the outset, it sought to 
distract critics by shifting responsibility to other EU member states such as Romania. Bulgaria 
did not enter into the dispute, fearful of France’s threat to call for a delay in its accession to the 
Schengen regime. As to the other member states, none have unequivocally condemned the 
French stance. Italian president Berlusconi and the Spanish President Zapatero even supported 
and encouraged the position of Sarkozy and the French measures.
51 Other EU member states 
chose to remain silent. Germany even decided to publicly negate, via the media, the assertions 
of support voiced previously by Sarkozy.
52  
The attitude demonstrated by the French government towards the EU institutions has also given 
rise to concern, quite apart from the legality of its policies towards Roma. The French 
                                                      
47 Commissioner for Human Rights, Positions on the Human Rights of Roma, CommDH/Position Paper 
(2010)3, Strasbourg, 3 May 2010, page 3. 
48 Ibid. Page 8. 
49 Eurobarometer survey 296 of July 2008 and EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Survey on EU Minorities and 
Discrimination - the Roma - November 2009. 
50 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Roma in Europe: The Implementation of European Union 
Instruments and Policies for Roma Inclusion – Progress Report 2008-2010, SEC(2010) 400 final, Brussels, 
7.4.2010. Refer also to the Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=518&langId=en 
Refer also to Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on advancing Roma Inclusion, 3019
th Employment, 
Social Policy Health and Consumer Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 7 June 2010. 
51 “French expulsions row doing nothing to help the Roma”, EUobserver, 20.9.2010 
http://euobserver.com/22/30841  
52 On a parallelism carried out by Sarkozy on expulsions taking place in Germany, Angela Merkel denied the 
comparison by saying that Germany’s actions “which amount to repatriating some 2,500 Roma people a year, 
are not “mass deportations” but “gradual returns”. “French expulsions row doing nothing to help the Roma”, 
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government has been keen to emphasise the sovereignty and grandeur of France, putting into 
question the legitimacy of both the EP and the Commission in scrutinising and overseeing 
national practices within the scope of EU law. Following the adoption of the 9 September EP 
Resolution, the Minister Eric Besson reacted by denouncing “the multiplication of lies and 
caricatures that led to the adoption of this resolution… France regrets the caricatures and the 
attempt to instrumentalise its action, which increases the risks of stigmatizing this population.
53 
Reding’s reference to the Second World War gave Sarkozy the opportunity to distract the 
debate away from the legality of the French practice by lambasting the Commissioner’s 
intervention and avoiding any comments on the substance of her condemnations. Furthermore, 
by ironically proposing that Luxembourg (country of which Reding is a national) should take 
over the expelled Roma before the French senators,
54 the French government intended to 
undermine the Commission’s position as a representative of the common European interest and 
instead reduced it to the country of nationality of its Commissioner for Justice. French ministers 
were also found to argue that they had “no lessons to learn from Brussels”, emphasising 
France’s conformity with EU legislation and rejecting any critique regarding interpretation.  
5.  The current EU law monitoring system: time for new initiatives? 
Could this political spectacle have been avoided? The actual outlines of the EU enforcement 
mechanisms do not provide an adequate response to avoid cases such as the one in France, 
where compliance with basic EU law commitments and the EU Charter of fundamental rights 
are put into question. At present, there are two main procedures in the EU legal system of 
application to deal with alleged breaches of EU law and fundamental rights standards:  
1.  The infringement proceedings stipulated in Article 258 TFEU. This procedure is a key 
tool in the hands of the Commission to guarantee that EU member states observe and correctly 
implement EU law. It grants the Commission the competence (and discretion) to monitor and 
initiate enforcement proceedings against a disobedient EU member state who is found to be in 
breach of EU law commitments.
55 The infringement proceedings are in practice a pre-litigation 
procedure for the Commission to resolve a ‘conflict’ with a particular EU member state at the 
political level before involving the Court of Justice. The Luxembourg Court can only intervene 
as a last resort should the (informal and formal) political dialogues between the parties fail. The 
rationale provided for in the Treaties is therefore ‘to encourage’ member states to modify their 
legislation without judicial proceedings. In practice, the procedure takes place around the 
following four phases:  
First, the member state is given the possibility to submit information and present its own 
position and views on the matter.  
                                                      
53 Communiqué de Presse, Résolution du Parlement Européen relative à l’évacuation des campements illicit: 
Eric Besson réagit, le jeudi 9 septembre 2010, Paris. « La multiplication des mensonges et des caricatures 
ayant abouti á l’adoption de cette resolution...la France regrette les caricatures et tentative 
d’instrumentalisation de son action, qui alimentent les risques de stigmatisation de cette population ». 
54 “Nikolas Sarkozy tells Luxembourg to take in Roma”, The Guardian, 15 September 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/nicolas-sarkozy-luxembourg-roma  
55 The article states that “If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the 
opportunity to submits its observations. If the state concerned does not comply with the opinion within the 
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the 
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Second, if the case is not resolved the Commission will issue a letter informing the state of the 
infringement. Except in situations considered to be of especial urgency, the member state is 
given a couple of months to respond to the Commission’s letter.  
Third, if no reply to the letter of formal notice is received or if the observations lodged by the 
member state are not considered to be satisfactory, the Commission will issue a ‘reasoned 
opinion’ establishing the specific legal grounds upon which the procedures are based and a 
deadline for the member state to resolve the situation. 
Fourth, should these pressures prove fruitless, the last stage is the possibility of the Commission 
to refer the case to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. If the Court finds that the member state 
has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties it will require the latter to comply with its 
judgment. Article 260 TFEU offers the possibility of imposing a financial penalty for failure to 
comply with its judgment.  
The infringement proceedings confer upon the Commission wide discretion when handling the 
developments and to continue with ‘informal’ negotiations with the member state during the 
entire procedure. This room of manoeuvre also applies as regards the option to bring the case 
before the Court of Justice should the case not be resolved in the pre-litigation phases.  
2.  The second procedure relevant to the French affair is stipulated in Article 7 TEU. This 
provision was originally introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 in order to equip the 
European institutions with the necessary means to ensure that all EU member states respect the 
general principles or ‘values’ upon which the EU has been founded.
56 Article 7 procedure aims 
at offering a preventive remedy and a penalty in the event of a serious and persistent breach of 
these common principles by a member state, which include all areas of activity by EU member 
states, even those not falling within the scope of EU law. In particular:  
First, the European Commission, the European Parliament, one third of the member states, or 
the Council (acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament) may determine that there is a “clear risk” of a “serious breach” by a 
member state of the values referred in Article 2”.
57  
Second, the Council may suspend a number of the rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaties to a member state found to be in “serious and persistent breach” of one of the 
fundamental principles upon which the EU has been founded, and which include the respect of 
fundamental rights.  
                                                      
56 Article 2 TEU states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
57 According to the Commission the introduction of the concept of ‘clear risk’ provides “… a means of sending 
a warning signal to an offending Member State before the risk materialises. It also places the institutions under 
an obligation to maintain constant surveillance, since the ‘clear risk’ evolves in a known political, economic 
and social environment and following a period of whatever duration which the first signs of, for instance, racist 
or xenophobic policies will have become visible”. Moreover, in what concerns the concept of “serious breach” 
the Commission has clarified that in order to determine the seriousness of the breach a variety of factors needs 
to be taken into account and for instance “… one might consider the social classes affected by the offending 
national measures. The analysis could be influenced by the fact that they are vulnerable, as in the case of 
national, ethnic or religious minorities or immigrants. The result of the breach might concern any one or more 
of the principles referred in Article 6 TEU”. Refer to the Commission Communication on Article 7 of the 
Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 
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Article 7 TEU procedure has so far never been used.
58 The main concern with both enforcement 
procedures is that they are heavily politicized and both are ‘ex post’ in nature (they are effective 
only after the violation of EU law and/or fundamental rights has been ‘fully’ proved). An 
exception would be the preventive phase of Article 7.1 TEU, but this mechanism neither 
ensures an immediate action nor gives any clear indications as to the kind of measures that 
could be adopted at EU level against a disobedient EU member state. Further, the fact that both 
procedures rely so heavily on ‘diplomatic solutions and strategies’ leave the democratic scrutiny 
of the entire process at stake and the individuals subject to unlawful derogations of EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights in a highly vulnerable situation before the EU member state 
involved. Neither of the procedures guarantees immediate EU action. There is in fact no proper 
monitoring mechanism in place that would prevent a situation such as the one in France from 
arising again and that gives the EU the capacity to act as soon as the risk of a flagrant breach of 
EU law and fundamental rights occurs. New EU level enforcement actions are therefore needed.  
6.  Conclusions: Towards a freezing enforcement procedure 
The Roma affair in France has constituted a test to the legitimacy and added value of the EU’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in a renewed (post-Treaty of Lisbon) institutional and 
fundamental rights setting. As has been showed in this Policy Brief, there is not only a difficult 
relationship between the above-mentioned facts of the French case and the legal contours of EU 
citizenship and free movement law. The effects of the French measures and political discourses 
(linking the Roma community with criminality and insecurity) over fundamental rights and the 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin also remain highly contested. The 
unfortunate developments (and contentious declarations) outlined in this Policy Brief, and the 
fact that France still continues to apply evacuation and expulsion measures of Romanian and 
Bulgarian nationals, further illustrate that the current enforcement tools in the hands of the EU 
are inefficient to satisfactorily halt breaches to basic EU law and fundamental rights principles 
and commitments by the EU member states. We have argued that one of the key lessons to 
emerge from this case is that the current set of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure EU member states’ compliance with European law are not fully satisfactory to address 
challenges such as those emerging from the French affair, and that a reflection should be opened 
to amend and improve them further. 
The EU should therefore develop a new (preventive) enforcement mechanism that would 
complement the existing ones (the infringement and the fundamental rights proceedings). This 
procedure would be primarily destined to ensure that contested national policies and practices 
falling within the remits of EU law and fundamental rights (and applying exceptions and/or 
derogations to European rights and freedoms) would be immediately ‘frozen’ while the formal 
opening of infringement or fundamental rights proceedings would be still be considered and/or 
under study by the relevant services of the European institutions. For such an ex ante procedure 
to ensure its full effectiveness, careful attention should be paid at times of ensuring its overall 
objectivity, impartiality and accountability. It would also be necessary that the opening of the 
procedure would not only lie in the hands of the Commission, but that the latter could be also 
launched on the initiative of the European Parliament.  
Its operability could also automatically lead to accelerated infringement proceedings against the 
EU member state at stake and to an expedited procedure (similar to the current urgent 
                                                      
58 This was subject of concern in the European Parliament, Resolution of 14 January 2009 on the situation of 
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preliminary ruling procedure for AFSJ-related policies)
59 before the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg, which would consist of the application of a shorter period for the parties involved 
to submit statements of case or written observations and/or for the written phase of the case to 
be omitted. The complementary nature of this procedure to the existing ones would not imply an 
amendment of the EU Treaties. Another issue for consideration is the devising of new strategies 
to improve the ‘access to justice’ by the Roma community in order to strengthen their capacity 
(and access to information) and ensure that their EU fundamental freedoms and rights are duly 
respected by national authorities. Moreover, in light of the ongoing accession processes
60 of the 
EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, serious consideration should be given to 
granting the Court of Justice in Luxembourg similar powers to those held by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg under the so-called Rule 39 procedure. The 
latter allows the ECtHR to adopt interim measures in those cases where there is an imminent 
risk of irreparable damage to human rights by a state party. Rule 39 means the effective freezing 
of the state party’s practices while the case is under consideration.
61  
The new freezing enforcement procedure would be activated through the existence of 
‘evidence’ provided (for instance) by the European Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA)
62 
along with its Fundamental Rights Platform (FRP) of Non-Governmental Organizations,
63 
which could be also tasked ‘to alert’ any suspected breaches of EU law and fundamental rights 
by EU member states. The next step would be the revision by the FRA of the pertinence of such 
allegations before a formal activation is put to the EU institutions. The existence of this EU-
wide network for cooperation and information exchange set to act as the main channel for the 
FRA to engage civil society would enable an EU-wide coverage of the implementation of EU 
law in an enlarged EU. They could thus be responsible for informing/alerting if a violation of 
fundamental rights or EU law is suspected. The involvement of a network of independent 
experts who can be consulted quickly to present a report in relevant member states should also 
be another initiative to be considered in the implementation of such a procedure. 
                                                      
59 Article 23a of Protocol 3 attached to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that “The 
Rules of Procedure may provide for an expedited or accelerated procedure and, for references for a preliminary 
ruling relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, an urgent procedure. Those procedures may 
provide, in respect of the submission of statements of case or written observations, for a shorter period … for 
the case to be determined without a submission from the Advocate General. In addition, the urgent procedure 
may provide for restriction of the parties and other interested persons … authorised to submit statements of 
case or written observations and, in cases of extreme urgency, for the written stage of the procedure to be 
omitted.” This has been developed in Article 76a of the Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the 
General Court, 2010/C177/02, OJ C177/37, 2.7.2010. 
60 Council of the European Union, Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession 
Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Brussels, 10817/10, 27 September 2010. 
61 European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court, Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, 1 June 2010. See 
also http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Applicants/Interim+measures/General+presentation  
62 On the FRA work on the situation of the Roma, see http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/roma/roma_en.htm  
63 http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/networks/partners/civil_society/civil_society_en.htm  About CEPS
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